The Siren Song of Airpower and Advanced Technology

 

In Homer’s “The Odyssey,” Odysseus’ ship sails past a shore inhabited by the Sirens, whose alluring call to his crew seeks to entice the men to join them ashore with the promise of supernatural wisdom, and the promise of freedom to sail on with that wisdom once imparted.  Odysseus sees the Siren’s song for what it is:  enticement so strong that a man, once enthralled, never wants to leave, even to the point of his death. 

Midway through my career as a Marine infantry officer I received orders to attend the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC).  Following graduation, I joined the faculty of ACSC as one of two Marine officers filling joint assignments as instructors.  What was supposed to be a three-year joint job was cut short by a year when I was selected for command of an infantry battalion.  But three years at the Mecca of Airpower was enough for this grunt.  One can only stand so much of a good thing -- nowhere else in DOD can a Marine go on vacation and get joint credit.

Colonel John Warden, author of “The Air Campaign” and proclaimed “architect” of the Desert Storm air campaign, had assumed command of ACSC just prior to my arrival as a student in the Class of 1994, and had radically overhauled the curriculum.   He welcomed that class on Day 1 and gave us the mission of finding a way to use airpower alone to win wars.  Warden was a “true believer” in the absolute supremacy of the strategic application of conventional airpower over all other arms.  So much so that his own theory was that technologically advanced conventional (not nuclear) airpower applied at just the right place and time (a critical node in an enemy state’s system) would cause a catastrophic, cascading failure of the enemy state’s entire system.  At the foundation of his theory was the need to view the enemy, not so much as formations of men and material, but as a system of interconnected nodes.  On paper, it was, and still is it seems, an alluring concept -- a Sirens’ song promising a quick and ground force-saving achievement of strategic war aims.

The belief that just the right application of technologically advanced conventional airpower can win any war without the need for costly and bloody “boots on the ground,” dates back almost to the first flight at Kitty Hawk.  Following the First World War, in which airpower was primarily used as a tactical, supporting arm for ground forces, airpower theorists such as Hugh Trenchard, Guilio Douhet, and Billy Mitchell, argued that technologically advanced airpower’s greatest value was not in its tactical, or even operational application, but in a strategic attack against an enemy’s most critical regime-supporting systems.   

In the US Army Air Corps, prior to the Second World War, a debate raged between theorizing airmen over which type of airpower, fighter/interceptor or heavy bomber, should be the focus of attention (and therefore garner the lion’s share of finite resources).  Each side addressed the further operations-enabling concept of air superiority (the degree to which one side in a conflict holds control of air power over opposing forces).  The fighter proponents argued that achievement of air superiority through fighter/interceptor operations in aerial combat was a crucial first step in any prolonged air campaign, and that without fighter/interceptor aircraft in sufficient numbers to overwhelm and destroy the enemy’s own fighters, follow-on strategic bombers could not be effective.  Proponents of strategic bombing believed that heavy strategic bombers, bristling with formidable defensive armament and flying in tight, mutually supporting formations, would not need fighter escort and would achieve local air superiority sufficient to allow attack of key strategic targets.  They believed that, as Douhet theorized, and British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin warned, “the bomber will always get through.” 

Given that, in the middle of the last century, the US mainland was out of reach of any foreseeable enemy’s bomber, the need for interceptor aircraft was deemed far less than the need for long-range heavy bombers.  Further, the bomber enthusiasts argued that heavily defensive-armed bombers would not need fighter escort and that any attention given to the development of long-range fighter aircraft was a waste of resources.  

Add to this Siren’s Song the promise of supernatural high altitude daylight precision bombardment with the technologically advanced Norden bombsight (“we can put a bomb in a pickle barrel from 20,000 feet”) and the position of the bomber proponents became too alluring to resist. The strategic airpower enthusiasts of the inter-war period also promised that US prioritization of resources to heavy bomber production would avoid the disastrous waste of men in the attrition battles of trench warfare in the First World War.

As even the most cursory examination of history reveals, the promise of winning the war from the air came with its own butcher bill to pay.  In 1943, unescorted heavy bomber formations flying missions over Nazi-occupied Europe were decimated.  The 8^th Air Force alone, lost more men killed in the skies over Europe, than the entire Marine Corps lost in the Pacific.  Air superiority was achieved over Europe, thanks to the eventual introduction of long-range fighter aircraft and the resultant unrecoverable high attrition of German fighter pilots.  As Dr. Rich Mueller, head of my instructor group at ACSC, said, “The air war over Europe was trench warfare in the sky.”

There was even still, a belief amongst the airpower zealots during that war that ground invasion of Europe was unnecessary.  Their argument was that now that air superiority (in some cases, air supremacy) had been achieved over Europe, the systematic destruction of Germany’s war-making capability would eventually be achieved – all from the air.

Of course, that would probably have meant that the Red Army would have taken not just Eastern Europe, but all Western Europe as well.  Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” would have fallen astride the English Channel.   

To this day, the Siren’s promise of technologically advanced airpower effectiveness continues to supplant the wisdom of practical experience.  The United States today is in possession of the most impressively advanced conventional airpower capability the world has ever seen.  The airpower Sirens sang that our unmatched strength and incredible accuracy would quickly bring the Islamic Republic of Iran to its knees. 

They are indeed on their knees.  But without a boot on their neck, they will not capitulate. 

Since WWII, we have conventionally bombed a succession of enemy state’s systems to dust.  Not one of them gave up, save Iraq; whose capital was occupied by U.S. ground forces.  

I would be the very last retired military professional to recommend a ground invasion of Iran.  But don’t sing me a lullaby and tell me it’s not nap time. 

To the next generation of political/military leadership: Don’t listen to the Siren’s song.  If the cost of introducing ground forces to put a boot on an enemy’s neck is not worth the strategic aim, it ain’t a well thought out strategic objective.

Risk Acceptance and the Future of the Republic

At the end of the Roman Republic, two decades before the birth of Christ,  Publius Vergilius Maro (Virgil) -- considered the most famous Roman poet -- penned the epic "Aeneid," chronicling a Trojan warrior's mythic ancestry of Rome.  Virgil took his protagonist, Aeneas, from the "Illiad" and fashioned a virtuous and courageous ancestor to whom Romans could look during a time of political upheaval.   

Virgil's masterpiece was entirely a made-up piece of propaganda, but it was bought hook, line, and sinker by the citizens of Rome.  In particular, Aeneas' "pieta" (selfless loyalty) became the animating spirit of the Roman Empire as it expanded across the known world.

From Aeneas' lips, via Virgil's pen, we have a saying that has motivated human endeavors more than any other like utterance for the millennia since:

Fortes Fortuna Juvat  

Fortune Favors the Brave (or Bold)

The phrase has slipped the lips of men and women of valor in challenging circumstances in every century and on every continent.

Military units across the globe and across the ages have adopted it as their moto and exemplar of their ethos. 

Pliny the Elder said it as he ordered his galley across the Bay of Naples under a cloud of Vesuvius' volcanic fallout in a heroic attempt to rescue fellow Romans at Pompeii. 

Pliny died shortly thereafter.  But that is the point.

The example of Pliny's selfless effort, in the mold of Aeneas, motivated his fellow Romans to greater actions in greater crises thence.

Our Republic currently faces a viral volcano whose fallout threatens to bury every cherished right and privilege for which generations of  Americans have placed their very lives at risk. 

Fortune favored the actions of the brave men who rallied against British government heavy-handedness in 1775.

Fortune favored the commitment of the brave men who pledged their lives and their sacred honor with signatures on the Declaration of Independence in 1776.

Fortune favored the bold act of General George Washington as he gambled on a newly developed smallpox vaccine for his army in winter camp in 1777.

Let's pause and look in depth at that bold move.

Smallpox was raging in North America at the time of the Revolution.  Most of the British soldiers sent to put down the colonial rebellion had already been exposed in Europe and were largely immune.  Those on the American continent were not.  Washington knew that were smallpox to sweep through his army in the field, the debilitating disease would render it completely ineffective and at the mercy of simple British attack.  But, vaccinating against smallpox was considered dangerous and was, dare the Colonel say it, politically incorrect -- the Continental Congress even went so far in their feckless fear as to pass a law forbidding inoculation.  

General Washington was mindful that disease (smallpox included) accounted for nine times more casualties than battles in 18th Century warfare.  He disregarded Congress' political posturing and boldly embarked on a smallpox inoculation program for his army.  Washington had to do it secretly -- his army was within easy striking range of the main British force and if they divined that the rebel army was temporarily incapacitated by the effects of the inoculation, they could stamp out the hope of the rebellion in so far as it depended on Washington's ability to keep an army in the field.   

Washington's bold move could have ended disastrously.  It was a high risk move.  But fortune favored his boldness. In the months ahead, wings of a small, but relatively healthy, Continental Army scored dramatic successes at Saratoga, and exhausted Cornwallis in a chase across the Carolinas.  Without the two of which, the climactic, war-ending battle at Yorktown would not have been possible. 

In the two and a half centuries since, fortune has favored bold American action in the face of daunting challenges, the recounting of which will no doubt risk the patience of the Colonel's meager readership.

The Colonel isn't praising foolhardy risk-taking -- you know, the kind of carelessness that the comely and kind-hearted Miss Brenda reminds him to avoid every time he leaves the house, and for good reason.  No, the key to fortunate outcomes is calculated risk.

Sun Tzu said it best: "Know your enemy and know yourself: in a hundred battles you will not be in peril."

Knowledge, therefore, is the indispensable foundation.

Not feelings...

Not popular belief or majority opinion...

Knowledge  

In any endeavor, if you prepare with study and arm yourself with truth, you will decidedly shift the probability of positive outcome in your favor. 

While a foundation of knowledge -- of the factors bearing on the situation and of one's own capabilities -- is foundational, there is the grasp of another intangible on which fortune smiles:

Morale

Napoleon's equation is instructive: "In war, the moral is to the physical as ten is to one."

Nowhere in the history is the multiplying effect of cohesive morale, and bold leadership more evident that at the 334 B.C. Battle of the Granicus River.

When Phillip of Macedon, the king of a resurgent Greek empire, died, his son Alexander inherited the throne and, with it, Phillip's goal of invading and subduing long-time adversary Persia.

It was a daunting goal.  The Persian Empire was far larger, wealthier, and accomplished than Macedon. 

But, Alexander, barely into his twenties, had quickly consolidated his father's recently-won empire -- quickly subduing rebellious Greek provinces -- and in the process had begun to develop an aura of personal invincibility.  Alexander led from the front; his weapons often drawing first blood. 

And, with his elite shock-troop body-guard, the 300-man Companion Cavalry, as his fiercely loyal and exemplary spearhead, Alexander's battlefield exploits were often the decisive action.  Morale in his army was ascendant.  

When Alexander crossed the Hellespont (the strait separating Greece and Asia Minor) in 334 B.C., the Persian forces in Asia Minor (modern day Turkey) adopted a strategy of exhausting the Greek army until well-defensible terrain could be used to halt and destroy Alexander's invasion force.  That terrain feature was the Granicus River.

When Alexander arrived on the south bank of the Granicus after a rapid and exhausting 60 - mile march, the young warrior king found  his adversary guarding the north bank.  The Persian commander calculated, quite reasonably, that if the Greeks attempted to cross the river the attackers could be cut down as they climbed the Granicus' steep banks on the Persian side.

Alexander's senior generals counseled caution.  They advised Alexander to seek another, less well-defended, crossing.  It was sound advice.

But Alexander had prepared himself mentally, and his army physically, for just this opportunity.  

The odds were against him.  The Persian army far outnumbered his own, and was arrayed in a commanding defensive position.  Alexander's forces needed rest.

Alexander, however, knew that he possessed key intangible strengths vis-a-vis the Persians.

First, Alexander's army was far more cohesive.  Morale springs from cohesion -- the bond between brothers-in-arms -- and, morale rises to leadership by example.  

The army facing Alexander was a polyglot of units drawn from across the Persian empire.  A large component of the Persian force was actually a Greek mercenary outfit.  

Alexander knew his enemy.  He knew his own capabilities.  And, he knew the high spirit of his army -- embodied by his own personal example.

Alexander immediately attacked.

It seems a rash action, taken almost without pause upon his arrival at the Granicus.  But, Alexander calculated the risk of immediate action against that of delaying, and saw the intangible blow to Persian morale going forward were his Greeks triumphant in this first contact.

While Alexander and his Companion Cavalry stood on the right flank of his army, a Greek feint against the Persian right drew attention and forces to meet it.  Alexander then led his spearhead splashing across the river and crashing into the Persian center.

The melee that followed was brutal, but the high morale of Alexander's men, and Alexander's bold leadership, prevailed against the greater numbers of the enemy.

What do the historical examples of Washington's and Alexander's risk-taking mean to our Republic today?  Well, our Republic's future success depends, in the Colonel's not-so humble opinion, on the level of risk adversity that our people allow to creep into their souls.  

The men and women who immigrated to our continent's shores, and then subdued and settled its breadth, were masters of the calculated risk. The safe bet would have been to remain in their countries of origin.  Further, the far less risky course of action for the new Americans would have been to remain huddled in the relative safety of enclaves east of the Appalachians.

But, our ancestors calculated the risk against the potential reward and attacked across their "Granicus."

Our ancestors accepted the risks of inoculation and defeated smallpox, typhus, yellow fever, and polio, even as many of their fellows counseled caution and peddled fear.

Our ancestors stood up to some of the greatest war machines in history -- Great Britain (twice), Germany (twice), Japan, the Soviet Union, to name but a few -- even as many of their fellow Americans counseled appeasement and accommodation.  

The Colonel is at the point of his life where his mortality is felt more and more keenly with every waking.  There's not much left in the tank for physical combat.  But, he will never stop exhorting his fellow Americans to seize on the example of their forebears and adopt the motto: 

Fortune Favors the Bold!            

The Coming Fourth American Civil War

Ask any public school graduate to provide the very basics of the seminal wars of the American experience and you will be lucky to get a vague accounting that may or may not include the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the War with Mexico, the Civil War, the War with Spain, the First World War, the Second World War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the two major campaign theaters (Iraq and Afghanistan) of the Global War on Terrorism.

Ask for causes and participants in each of the above and you will be lucky to get much more than a shrug of the shoulders and a dismissive, "Dude, that's history.  It don't matter anymore..."  

So, the Colonel knows that any post hereon which deals with any critical analysis of history (particularly causes and effects of military conflicts) runs the risk of finding their way to the bottom of the list of most-read.  Nonetheless, he is uncontrollably driven to posit a likely future event given the current state of American social and political discourse viewed through the lens of American history.

The Colonel believes we are on the cusp of the Fourth American Civil War.

At this point, the Colonel is sure that the lips of a majority of the Alabama and LSU fans who began reading this missive have already tired, and they have left to google search tree-killing herbicides and corndog recipes.  The rest of you dear and valued readers are no doubt scratching your hat racks and asking,

"Fourth American Civil War?"

Yep.  We Americans have endured at least three previous major civil wars since European colonists began beaching boats on the New World's coasts. 

"But, Colonel.  My high school U.S. History teacher taught us that there was just one civil war and it was fought by the North to free the slaves in the South."

The Colonel knows what you were taught.  He had the same textbooks.  But, you see, there are these marvelous things called non-fiction history books that actually contain critical analysis beyond the one paragraph summary indoctrinations provided by modern public school textbooks.  Read enough of these marvelous critical examinations of history and you can actually begin to discern the truth of history.  Not only that, but you can learn to critically analyze the present and predict possible futures.

The Colonel's bit-more-than-cursory examination of history informs him that there have actually been several major, and many minor, civil wars on the North American continent since the 16th Century.  Let's take a look at three from which we can draw conclusions that may inform us about the coming fourth.

King Phillip's War
            Hop in the way-back machine with the Colonel and let's flash back to the year 1675.  The scene is the northeastern region of the future United States we now refer to as New England.  Five decades of European colonists had established enclaves along the New England seaboard and despite on and off skirmishing with the Native American people then occupying the territory (having displaced others), the separate European enclaves had lived largely in peace by establishing alliances with the various tribes against those tribes enemies.  Under the paramount chief of the Wampanoag Confederacy, Massasoit, the native population, though decimated by disease had maintained an equilibrium of sorts with the European settlers and the two occasionally joined forces to resist encroachments and raids by outside tribes.  But, as the tide of European settlement continued rise, competition for land and resources began to mount correspondingly.  The natives were restless.

With the deaths of Massasoit and his oldest son in 1692, Massasoit's younger son, Metacomet assumed leadership of the Wampanoags.  He was a rather prideful man, full of his position, and assumed the name King Phillip because he believed himself to be on par not with the various village and town leaders of the colonists, but with their king in England.  He continued his father's strategy of peaceful social and economic interrelationships with the colonists.  However, he began to doubt that the colonists felt the same way about the relationship that he did, and he chafed at what he considered disrespect and breaking of promises as the settlements expanded into more and more of traditional Wampanoag land.

King Phillip began to conspire with tribes in the interior, whipping up anti-European sentiment and promising to destroy the European settlements before the European population got too big to stop.  But, King Phillip was not able to enlist all of the various tribes in his conspiracy and several remained loyal to the Europeans with whom they had developed deep social and beneficial economic relationships they were loathe to abandon.

During the spring of 1675, warriors from tribes loyal to King Phillip began raids against isolated European settlements.  The European reaction was swift and indiscriminate.  Soon open war wracked the region.  Native Americans were caught up on both sides of the war in fighting and destruction that eclipsed any the region had ever seen.  By the end of hostilities a year later some of the major native tribes had suffered 50 to 80% population losses.  The European colonists had suffered nearly 10% population losses.  Scores of towns and settlements on both sides were completely destroyed.

King Phillip's War, which had enough definitive hallmarks to be considered a civil war, was the most destructive war on the North American continent per capita.  Even surpassing the calamity of the War for Southern Independence (aka Civil War) in 1861 - 1865 in terms of percentage of population and property lost.

King Phillip's War was the first major American civil war.  It's casus belli was primarily competition over land and resources.

The American Revolution
             Arguably, the seeds for the American colonial rebellion against Britain were planted during what we call the French and Indian War  -- a relatively minor campaign in the titanic European struggle that wracked the world in the middle of the 18th Century.  Native American populations again found themselves on both sides of a conflict -- this time between France and England.  Native tribes that attempted to stay out of the fight were indiscriminately attacked by both sides.  

To pay for the cost of that war, Great Britain levied taxes on commerce with its colonies.  The so-called Stamp Act of 1765, requiring that all publications and public records in the American Colonies be printed on paper containing a paid-for stamp, was one of the most ubiquitous and irritating of these taxes -- particularly so because it was imposed without participation and/or approval of the political representation in America.  Ergo the resistance slogan: "No taxation without representation."  

Commercial interests in the New England colonies -- particularly Boston -- agitated more and more fervently against London's heavy-handed and dismissive attitude toward its colonial subjects in America and began to act out in not-so passive resistance.  This prompted a dramatic increase in British troop presence (including mercenary forces) that further exacerbated the situation. 

The British move to seize militia-stockpiled arms and ammunition in Lexington and Concord set the spark to the powder keg of Colonial resentment against the heavy handedness of the Crown -- at least in New England.

In the Southern Colonies the reaction to the anti-Crown activities in New England was a mixture of horror, revulsion, and fear.  There was already developing a cultural divide between the two regions and the Southern Colonies were, frankly, happy with the very beneficial trade of their agricultural commodities with Britain.  The majority of colonists in the Southern Colonies were either completely loyal to the Crown or, in the case of settlers in remote western lands, ambivalent to a concept of "independence" they already enjoyed de facto.  It took more than a year of open hostilities in New England, before the representatives of enough Southern Colonies were cajoled into supporting the Continental Congress' declaration of independence.

It wasn't until the British carried the war to the South in 1780 that more than a small minority of Southerners participated on either side.  But, heavy-handed tactics by Cornwallis and two of his more notorious lieutenants (Lt.Col. Banastre Tarleton and Maj. Patrick Ferguson), incited open warfare (true civil war) between loyalists and rebels (aka patriots).  The intensity of fighting in the war of maneuver employed by General Washington in the north (primarily aimed at keeping a viable force in the field -- the destruction of which would have snuffed out the rebellion) paled in comparison to the ferocity of fighting between Americans in the South as loyalists and rebels (in militia formations and out) settled old scores and created new scores to be settled.

The American Revolution, particularly in the South, was the second American civil war.  

The American Civil War
       The third major civil war on the North American continent (at least since the arrival of Europeans) was the war fought over southern states' secession from the United States.  History written by the winners of that conflict states flatly that the war was fought to "free the slaves." This belies the fact that Lincoln's war to "preserve the Union" did not assume the abolitionist mantle until halfway through the conflict.  Confederate apologists argue that the war was fought over "economic" reasons.  They are correct, but turn a blind eye to the fact that the economy in the south was built on the back of chattel slavery.  

The war fought between 1861 and 1865 was conceived by politicians from two regions (north and south) with widely different economic bases (industrial vs agricultural) and governing philosophies (bias toward national supremacy vs tendency toward state sovereignty).  The war was disastrous for the south -- a significant portion of its infrastructure was wrecked, cities and towns burned, and farms laid waste.  It took the better part of the next century for the region to recover economic vibrancy.  But, from a purely scientific viewpoint, it can be argued that the American Civil War actually sowed seeds of American Exceptionalism whose germination bore amazing fruit in the next century.                                  

The Coming Fourth American Civil War
       War is the single most prevalent theme in the history of man.  Wars between peoples who on the surface have all but the most superficial things in common is common.  Even the most cursory examination of history shows that.  To believe that the American experience will be any different..., well..., it hasn't been so far; and it will likely not be any different in the future.
               

The Colonel believes another major American civil war is all but inevitable, to be fought for much the same reasons the first three major civil wars (and countless minor civil wars) were.   It might even be America's next great conflict...


...or it might be the coming war with China.  The Colonel's crystal ball is a little cloudy on that point this morning. 

     

Killing Democracy

It frightens the Colonel more than just a little (and he ain't scared of much) that the future of our Republic rests today in the hands of power-seekers whose cynical use of the inherently tyrannical concepts of democracy (also known as government by mob rule) and socialism threatens the very foundations upon which the most free people in the history of mankind live and work.

Those who would aspire to leadership in the affairs of our grand Republic would do well to study the actions of a great leader 236 years ago this month.

Allow the Colonel to set the scene for you:

The main fighting force of the American rebellion against Great Britain was encamped at Newburgh, New York.  They, with more than a little help from the French Army and Navy, had shocked the world with the defeat of a British expeditionary force at Yorktown a year and half earlier.  The remainder of British forces were bottled up in New York City, and the Continental Army remained nearby at Newburgh to keep an eye on them while an American delegation negotiated a peace treaty and independence in London.

One of General George Washington's most difficult tasks as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army (the army of the American colonial rebellion against the British Crown) was keeping an army in the field.  As long as a Continental Army existed, the rebellion existed.  As long as the rebellion existed, hope of independence existed.  

The Continental Army was a whole different animal than the local and colony (state) militias.  The various militias were untrained, mostly poorly led, and only showed up to participate (usually with poor results) in battles.  After a battle (often in the midst of one) the militia melted away and returned to their homes.  Militias started the war for independence -- but it would take a continuously fielded army to win that war.        

Keeping an army in the field requires material, leadership, and, most importantly, a steady supply of manpower.  Manning an army, particularly in a relatively free society, is a tricky business.  Most nations employ some sort of conscription or draft.  Richer nations rely on a combination of a draft and volunteers (providing compensation and benefit inducements).  The richest nations often do away with a draft altogether (in times of relative peace) and rely strictly on an all-volunteer (read: "recruited") force. (In the United States most young men and women do not seriously consider military service until contacted by a recruiter and sold on the benefits of serving.)

During the American rebellion, there was no central Colonial authority to draft or recruit personnel for the Army and fledgling Navy.  The individual colonies were cajoled by the Continental Congress (and, in some cases, by direct communication from George Washington himself) to raise forces for extended service with the line of the Continental Army.  Most enlistments were for only one year and often for only 6 months.  While some soldiers committed to serving for the duration of the conflict, most of the army's manpower was in a constant state of flux.  

A large part of the reason for this constant state of flux was the fact that compensation for service was often only promissory -- individual colonies promised to compensate (in one form or another) later for service now.  The national government was really no government at all -- it had little to no power over the individual colonies who each considered themselves practically independent nations in their own right.  Any compensation and provisions provided by the Continental Congress came mostly from whatever loans the individual colonies and foreign governments (primarily France, Holland, and Spain) voluntarily provided.  

The Continental Congress, and the individual colonies, did initially rely on fiat currency (paper money not backed by precious metal or other collateral) but before long that currency was considered worthless and not acceptable for trade, and by the time of the occurrence about which this post is written (early 1783) the compensation for the officers and men of the Continental Army was seriously in arrears.

In fact, in 1782, the Continental Congress actually formally suspended all individual compensation for the Army, the intent being to settle up with the officers and men after the war was over.
    
So, with no battles to fight since the defeat of Cornwallis' force at Yorktown in 1781, the roughly 8,000 man Continental Army sat on its hands in camp -- under-equipped, under-fed, unpaid, and unhappy.

An army with time on its hands -- even a well-paid and well-fed one -- will soon turn its energies to complaint.  Place a few unprofessional officers with personal agendas in charge and those complaints will turn to conspiracy.  In camp at Newburgh, New York, the Continental Army was rife with conspiracy.

In early 1783, an anonymous letter circulated among the officers at Newburgh condemning the inaction and inattention of the Continental Congress to the plight and pay of the Continental Army, and proposing a march on the seat of that congress at Philadelphia to rectify the situation.

In the Colonel's not-so-humble and not-so-little-studied opinion, one of Washington's chief subordinates -- General Horatio Gates (a former British Army general and open rival of Washington for command of the rebellion) -- if not the actual author of the letter, was the power behind the hand behind the pen.  Washington had left Gates in charge of the force at Newburgh while he dealt with larger matters of the entire force and the Colonel believes Gates saw an opportunity (with the preponderance of the American army at his back) to stage a coup and take personal leadership of the entire rebellion (or maybe even use his control to bargain with the British for his own personal gain).

At any rate, a conspiratorial meeting of the officers was called for the 11th of March, 1783. 

It was democracy in action.

That's right, the Colonel says this mutinous conspiracy had democracy as its agent of creation and force of animation.

You see, in a democracy, one man can whip up and ride the passions of a majority to his own ends and to the end of the interests of the minority and eventually to the end of the freedoms of the whole.  The leaders of the Newburgh conspirators intended to hold a democratic vote, get majority approval for their plan, and then stage a coup that would have defeated the entire purpose of the revolution -- the establishment of a (little "r") republican form of governance for the upstart American nation.  

The founders of our great nation DID NOT intend to found it as a democracy.  They were (for the most part) well-read and educated men whose study of historical examples of government forms informed them that a democracy was the least stable and ultimately most self-destructive form of government known to man.  The written arguments (the Federalist Papers, and other public and private letters) for establishment of our current Constitutional Republic -- are replete with dismal of democracy, decrying that form of government as dangerous and wholly unsuited for the purpose of the grand republic (with minority State and individual rights protections) envisioned.  Democracy leads to coups -- coups lead to tyranny.

Need further proof of the Colonel's assertion?  Go read both the  Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, and report back to the Colonel the number of times you find the actual word "democracy" or even discussion of the concept of democracy.  

The Colonel will save you some time.  "Democracy" does not appear anywhere in either document.

But, back to Newburgh...  

Washington got wind of the called meeting, denounced the "disorderly" nature of the proposed meeting, and instead issued an order sanctioning a meeting to occur on the 15th.  Washington ordered Gates to preside over the meeting and to prepare a report of the grievances to be made to the Commander in Chief.

Gates and the officers of the army did as commanded by Washington.  Shortly after Gates gaveled the meeting to order, Washington, to the surprise and astonishment of all, strode into the meeting hall and took the stage.

His address to his officers denounced the conspiracy and its intentions, and appealed to their professionalism and patriotism, but seemed to fall on deaf hears.  The army held Washington and his leadership in the highest esteem, but his exhortation at this point was no match for their exasperation.  

The Colonel believes that study of Washington's Newburgh Address should be mandatory for all members and prospective members of the U.S. military's officer corps.  It is a passionate plea, not for "democratic" ideals, but for a professional consideration of "republicanism" in which the rights and privileges of all are best promoted and protected.   

A member of Washington's staff in 1783 -- David Cobb -- wrote in 1825, "I have ever considered that the United States are indebted for their republican form of government solely to the firm and determined republicanism of George Washington at this time.

But, at the end of his prepared speech to the officers assembled there at Newburgh in the cold, late winter of 1783, the passions of the majority still ran hot for action.  Washington sensed his failure to sway the majority -- democracy was howling and ready to go on the prowl.  He searched for the right words to add to his argument, and then remembered a letter from a member of the Continental Congress who had promised Washington that they were doing everything in their power to compensate and reward the sacrifices of the men of the Continental Army.  Washington reached into the pocket of his coat, withdrew and unfolded the letter.  He then realized that he couldn't focus on the writing.

Washington paused, and then did something then considered unprofessional for an officer to do in public and completely out of character for the Commander in Chief -- he donned a pair of reading glasses.  Witnesses later said that the entire assemblage drew breath in an astonished gasp.  Washington apologized humbly, saying, "Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country." 

Whether or not it was intentional stagecraft on Washington's part will never be known.  Washington's stature and character was such that no one ever thereafter dared ask him about the incident.  And, no record exists that Washington ever mentioned it.   

Washington's officers, unswayed by the words of his prepared speech, were thunderstruck instead by his example of personal sacrifice.  They disbanded their democracy, and the future Republic was saved.

If any man were truly capable of pulling off the coup contemplated by the Newburgh conspirators it was Washington.  He could have been the "democratically" approved King of America, had is character been so inclined.  Instead, he was an honorable man.  The indispensable man of his generation.  The Father of our Republic.

The Colonel prays for our nation principled, Constitutional, (little "r") republican patriots like Washington.  He also prays for republican enlightenment for those who would use democracy to gain socialist power by leveraging the material desires of the majority against the liberty and best interests of We the People.    

Nomenclature

“You may be 38 years old, as I happen to be. And one day, some great opportunity stands before you and calls you to stand up for some great principle, some great issue, some great cause. And you refuse to do it because you are afraid…. You refuse to do it because you want to live longer…. You’re afraid that you will lose your job, or you are afraid that you will be criticized or that you will lose your popularity, or you’re afraid that somebody will stab you, or shoot at you or bomb your house; so you refuse to take the stand.

Well, you may go on and live until you are 90, but you’re just as dead at 38 as you would be at 90. And the cessation of breathing in your life is but the belated announcement of an earlier death of the spirit.”

     -- Martin Luther King Jr.

Here's where the Colonel stands.  The Colonel is a critically thinking, classically liberal, socially conservative, anti-fascist, (little "r") republican, (big "C") Constitutionalist.

If that nomenclature seems incongruous or doesn't make sense, then you are one, some, or all of the below:

     a) a spoiled, public school-educated member of the very fascist organization known as ANTIFA;

     b) a public school-educated Millennial who thinks the very fascist organization known as ANTIFA is actually anti-fascist;

     c) a low-information voter from either side of the political divide who spends more time generating and sharing Facebook memes poking fun at the other political party and its leaders, than engaging in the critical thought and continuing education required to logically and civilly defend your position on issues of the day;

     d) an LSU or Bama graduate;

     e) a current member of the U.S. Congress

     f) someone with a real life, who has far more important things to do with their time than to spend it, as the Colonel does, researching and writing about the arcane.

Allow the Colonel to break down his name and nomenclature for you:

Colonel.  Military rank achieved during nearly three decades of service as an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps.  (The Colonel remains at a loss to explain how a man of meager talent and ability as he could attain such rank and will have you know that he retired before the Marine Corps made the colossal mistake of making him a general.)

Classically Liberal.  The great thinkers from whose minds and experience the concept of classical liberalism sprung -- Adam Smith, John Locke, Thomas Robert Malthus, Jean-Baptiste Say,  David Ricardo, Thomas Jefferson, and other critical thinkers -- saw free market capitalism as the greatest guarantor of both an individual's opportunity to achieve self-actualization (not a term they used at the time) and a society's opportunity to thrive economically.  A classical liberal sees the modern social liberal (read: socialist) welfare state as antithetical to the above and actually preventive of individual self-actualization and society's economic prosperity.  A classical liberal believes in a limited government (like the one designed by the crafters of the U.S. Constitution) which purpose is limited to:

     -- the protection of individual rights
     -- the provision of services not provided in a free market
     -- the provision of a common defense against foreign invaders
     -- the enactment and enforcement of civil laws
     -- ensuring a stable currency and appropriate infrastructure for             communications and commerce 

* It should be noted that, contrary to the currently popular and uneducated socialist canard, the perceived comparative decline in economic opportunity and standard of living for the most recent generations is NOT due to any excesses or imperfections in free market capitalism, but rather, has been brought about primarily as a result of the socialist abandonment of free market capitalism in favor of the welfare state and central economic planning.  Many uninformed social liberals point to Sweden as an example of the success of their concept of "democratic socialism."  The truth is  that Sweden's abandonment of classical liberalism and free market capitalism to experiment with radical democratic socialism nearly wrecked their economy and was demonstrating dramatic declines in individual liberty and economic productivity until recently arrested by classical liberal governmental and economic reforms that have restored Sweden's vibrancy -- in other words, Sweden looks so good today precisely because they are returning to free market capitalism and away from statism and the welfare state.  

Socially Conservative.  The foundation of the Colonel's social conservatism is his personal relationship with his Creator (the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob), made possible by the atoning sacrifice of Jesus, faith in whom animates the Colonel by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.  The Colonel takes no side on any social issue without consideration of God's will for him.  God's spirit not only convicts the Colonel of personal sin, but also grants him (and all who seek His will) spiritual discernment to know what is right in His eyes and what is the Colonel's right actions toward others.  In other words, the Colonel's social conservatism is not his personal position -- it is the position God convicts him to take.  It is the position of grace toward all other humans.  

*The Colonel recognizes that he ain't real graceful toward others most times -- this post included.  He ain't perfect, but God's not through with him yet.    

Anti-fascist.  Websters Dictionary defines fascism as: "a political philosophy, movement, or regime that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that stands for a centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition [italics, the Colonel's]." 

Fascism, as the Colonel opposes it and as is otherwise defined, is a concept for the creation of a regulated economic structure to transform social relations within a modern, self-determined culture.  Practitioners of fascism are uninhibited in their use of violence as a tool for persuading others to accede to their viewpoint. 

(The very fascist organization which moronically calls itself ANTIFA is the very living, breathing, hypocritically incarnate definition of fascism.)     

Dictatorial, or authoritarian, fascism has been the end result of nearly every society's headlong dive into the socialist shallow end of the governmental systems pool.  Those who wish to impose a socialist system on the American people (in direct opposition to the original intent of the U.S. Constitution) disguise their motives by placing the word "democratic" in the title, "Democratic Socialism."  To the history-challenged and politically uninformed, this makes this brand of socialism sound almost benign.  But, make no mistake, democratic socialism is in fact mob rule over a forced wealth redistribution (as opposed to voluntary charity) system that will always place the most charismatic tyrants in charge.
    
The goal of democratic socialism, in its proponents' and practitioners' own words, is:

"that both the economy and society should be run democratically—to meet public needs, not to make profits for a few. To achieve a more just society, many structures of our government and economy must be radically transformed through greater economic and social democracy so that ordinary Americans can participate in the many decisions that affect our lives." (Platform of the Democratic Socialist Party of America)

The above sounds really nice and all..., but it ain't what our nation was founded on and for -- far, far from it.  Our current system of government (at least the one enshrined in our Constitution) already guarantees the opportunity for "ordinary Americans" to "participate in the many decisions that affect our lives."  Which leads the Colonel to his last points.

The Colonel is a (big "C") Constitutionalist.  The Colonel loves and reveres the Constitution of the United States and the representative republic (NOT a democracy) that it (by "We the People") created and sustains.  And not just because he swore a solemn and everlasting oath to "support and defend" with his life.  The Colonel loves and reveres the U.S. Constitution because he KNOWS it, and in the knowing -- in the continuing study and rediscovery of its genius and corrected flaws -- the Colonel finds an abiding appreciation for the checks and balances that both give voice to the "ordinary Americans" and protects them from their own excesses of partisanship and avarice.  

The Colonel is a (little "r") republican because his knowledge of history and albeit marginal ability to think critically informs him that unchecked democracies always implode into tyranny.  The U.S. Constitution was written by men whose knowledge of history and ability to think critically informed them that, in the Colonel's words, "There's a fine, popular line between freedom and tyranny. A strict interpretation of the United States' Constitution keeps that line bright and visible." 

Far more learned men than the Colonel, acting on far more wise principle than he, subordinated their own partisanship and avarice to create and sustain the Constitution of the United States and the representative republican form of government for which it is the Peoples' guidebook.  

Far be it from the Colonel to consider, let alone advocate, any other system of government for the People of America... and the Americas. 

All the foregoing being said, if the People of our land do decide in democratic fervor to once again "dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them," the Colonel stands ready to assume the mantle of responsibility as a relatively  benevolent dictator.

Let's pray, for all our sake, it never comes to that.   

Choices

The Colonel worries another American Civil War is brewing. 

More seems to divide Americans today than unites us.  Our passions rule us -- driven by our selfishness and pride.  Constitutional protections of the rights of individuals be damned if they conflict with our feelings or convenience.

Pick your positional poison -- there's two diametrically opposed sides to the argument fueled less by critical analysis and rational thought and more by uncompromising self-interest and political power accumulation.

Each side easily points out the glaring inconsistencies and  inherent hypocrisies in the other's argument, all the while masking their own with mockery, misdirection, and more volume.

It's enough to make this old centurion cry "a pox on both your houses," and hide away on the social frontier to ride out the coming storm.   

Except... not choosing a side rarely works out.  One side or the other will eventually find you out and demand your loyalty or make you suffer their wrath.  History is replete with examples the Colonel could, but won't, parade across your screen.  If you haven't had the time to educate yourself on a bit of history to this point, it's doubtful the Colonel's efforts to do so will bear any fruit at this late date.

Suffice it to say -- you are going to have to pick a side. 

Pick carefully.  The winners will write the next chapters of our civilization's history; the losers will be written off and out.  

So, how to pick?  How to know which side is right?

Newsflash:  Neither side is right.

There is no such thing as the "right side of history."  There is only the "might" side of human history. 

Whichever side you choose will require, if you truly commit to that side's cause, that you compromise your principles, your faith, or your core values in one way or another.

Only God gets to adhere to absolutes.  Humans are inherently predisposed to shades of gray.  It's what makes us human.  We each carry our own identifying imperfections, else we would be robotic angels incapable of exercising the gift of self-determination and self-expression that makes each one of us distinguishable from the rest. 

So, you have a choice before you.  The same sort of choice that faced Americans in 1775.  You actually have three choices, just as they did.  And, remember, only the winners get to write history and proclaim which side was "right."

Like the American in 1775, you can stay loyal to an overbearing government, accepting more security in exchange for less liberty.

Or, like the American in 1775, you can choose to demand the freedom of limited self-government with far less guarantee of security from external threats. 

Or, you can choose what nearly a third of Americans did in 1775 -- attempt to ride the fence, hiding out on the frontier.

The Colonel's great (x 7) grandfather, Thomas Bry Gregory, attempted just that as the American revolution began.  He was content to sit out the fight started by those crazy Bostonions -- his home on the Southern frontier (Western North Carolina) was almost completely out of the reach of any government.  So much so that he probably didn't consider himself to be of any nationality whatsoever.  The strategy worked well for the first few years of the war, but wars have a habit of disregarding the best laid plans.

Perhaps the greatest British strategic mistake of the war was Cornwallis' campaign in the Southern colonies.  Failing to destroy Washington's army in the Northern colonies in the first few years of the war, British strategists began to see New England as a lost cause (at least in the short term) and turned their attention to shoring up the Loyalist cause in the far more valuable agricultural south.  The outbreak of revolution in New England had sparked a civil war in the south -- with British authority in the coastal enclaves replaced by revolutionary governments, bitter internecine score-settling raged across the southern interior.  Cornwallis was sent to pacify the southern colonies -- his actions (more accurately the actions of firebrand subordinates Tarleton and Ferguson) had the opposite effect.

Cornwallis captured Charleston, South Carolina in May of 1780 and pushed inland with a strategy of raising loyalist militias and restoring them to authority.   At Charlotte, Cornwallis dispatched Major Patrick Ferguson to raise loyalist militia in upstate South Carolina and thereby protect the western flank of the British main force in the South.  

Enter the Overmountain Men.

West of the Appalachians, American frontiersmen had settled lands almost completely separated from any governmental control -- British or revolutionary.  They proudly referred to themselves as the Overmountain Men.  In fact, they had established their own form of government -- a compact called the Watauga Association.   When the Revolution started, the Overmountain Men of the Watauga Association sided with the revolutionaries, formed militia companies, and began to raid loyalist settlements.  

After one particularly destructive raid, Major Ferguson and his loyalist battalion closely pursued but couldn't catch the Overmountain Men before they retreated safely back across the mountains.  Ferguson sent the following message to the Overmountain Men:  "Lay down your arms and swear allegiance to the Crown, or I will lay waste to your country with fire and sword."  

This didn't sit well with the Overmountain Men.

Not only did the Overmountain Men take up Ferguson's challenge, but they called on all of the patriots in the region to join with them in facing Ferguson.  

Enter Thomas Bry Gregory. 

The Colonel's great (x 7) grandfather had evidently had enough.  The civil war in the south had actually been much more damaging than the war in New England.  Whole towns and settlements had been been destroyed in the bitter back and forth between revolutionaries and loyalists.  Gregory threw in his lot with the revolutionaries.  His son, Harden Harley Gregory (the Colonel's great (x 6) grandfather), also joined the cause.

As word of the size of the force gathering to confront Ferguson reached his ears, he led his battalion back toward the safety of the region held by Cornwallis' main body.  They didn't make it.

The Colonel's great (x 6 and 7) grandfathers and 900 of their closest revolutionary comrades caught up to Ferguson and his 1100 loyalist militia at a piece of high ground called Kings Mountain.  Ferguson and his men had bivouacked on the crest and had no idea that they were surrounded until the shooting and hollering started.  Ferguson (the only non-American in the battle) was killed and his entire force killed or taken prisoner after a brutal hour of close-quarter battle.

The battle of Kings Mountain was a (if not the) turning point in the American Revolution.  The revolutionary militia success convinced Washington to send General Nathanael Greene and a wing of the Continental Army south to bolster the revolutionary cause and harry Cornwallis.  Cornwallis chased Greene and his subordinates across the Carolinas until, exhausted, he and his force fell back on Yorktown for reinforcement and replenishment.

The rest is history... if you care to study it.  

The Colonel expects, when the time for choosing comes, that he will side with the revolutionaries -- those choosing less security in exchange for more freedom -- like his great granddads.

The Colonel is a Rebel, afterall.   

   

De Soto's Gold

The third book completed in the Colonel's summer professional reading program is Charles Hudson's "Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun; Hernando de Soto and the South's Ancient Chiefdoms."

The Colonel has long been fascinated by the notion of the exploration of the Southeastern interior by the Spanish two centuries before English-speaking colonies were established on the Eastern seaboard.  But, until now, that fascination had not carried much beyond the facts in the preceding sentence.  Hudson's book provides a narrative (complied from contemporary chronicles and supported by archeological evidence) of the de Soto expedition that not only puts flesh on the bones of the Colonel's skeletal knowledge, but provides detailed fatty tissue as well.

In the late Spring of 1541, an army of (mainly) Spanish explorers led by veteran conquistador Hernando de Soto crossed the Little Tallahatchie River somewhere within 20 or 30 miles of the Colonel's vast holdings here at the shallow northern end of deep southern nowhere.  The exact site of the crossing is impossible to verify -- the Colonel would like to think that de Soto's army (or at least exploratory patrols therefrom) actually traversed ground now a part of the Colonel's vast holdings.  The lands through which they marched (between the Chicaza chiefdom near present day Columbus, Mississippi -- 100 miles to the southeast -- and the Quizquiz chiefdom on the Mississippi River south of present day Memphis) was an empty wilderness, devoid of human inhabitants.  

The Colonel is old, but even he wasn't around at the time to be able to verify.   

The de Soto expedition had begun nearly two years earlier.  Launched from Cuba in May of 1539, de Soto's army landed in Tampa Bay and from there literally fought (both against geography and inhabitants) their way around to present day Tallahassee, thence north through Georgia, South Carolina, and well into North Carolina before turning westward through the Appalachian mountains into Tennessee, and from there, into Alabama and then across Northern Mississippi.   

By the time they crossed the Little Tallahatchie, the original strength (approximately 600) of de Soto's army had been reduced by more than a third.  But, they had killed far, far more than that number of the inhabitants of the lands through which they marched, searching for "La Florida's" equivalent to the exceedingly rich culture of the Inca, participation in the subjugation of which had already made de Soto a rich and influential man.  The aim of de Soto's exploration of the Southeast was purely conquest and colonization of a wealth-producing culture for which he would be the principal and not just a participant.  

De Soto's army was an amalgam of seasoned soldiers and treasure-seeking adventurers.  They were armed with weapons and clad in armor that was at the pinnacle of warfare tactics and technology at the time.  A third of the army were horsemen, employing tactics honed in centuries of conflict against the Moorish invaders of the Iberian peninsula.  It was the warrior culture that had developed from the Iberian Christians' response to and eventual reversal of the Islamic invasion of the Iberian peninsula that made conquest of the New World's richest and most powerful civilizations possible, even when Spanish armies were vastly outnumbered by the armies of those civilizations.  

The men of de Soto's army, according to Hudson, did not identify as Spanish.  Spain, as we know it today, did not exist in the 16th Century.  The power on the Iberian peninsula belonged to the regions of Castile and Aragon (united by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella late in the 15th Century); those regions themselves being recent amalgamations of several smaller and distinct regions (some of which even today agitate for independence from Spain).  Hudson says that, rather than as Spaniards, the men of de Soto's army considered themselves Castilian, or natives of the smaller regions or towns of Iberia.  But, primarily, they identified as Christians.  This primary identification by religion, born of centuries in opposition to Islam, was so ingrained that it caused them to view all others as infidels.  The inhabitants of the Caribbean islands, the Inca, the Aztec, and the inhabitants of La Florida (as they referred to the land to the north and east of Mexico) were infidels, as well.  Infidels were to be subdued by the sword, conversion to Christianity was to be a consequence of conquest.   

That they viewed the native inhabitants of the New World as subservient infidels, explains (but doesn't excuse) the cruel and rapacious nature of their actions against them.  At every encounter with a new village or chiefdom, de Soto assumed the position of a superior, demanding tribute of corn (the staple of the late Mississippian culture of the Southeast and the primary victual on which the army subsisted) slaves, and riches. If the natives were accommodating, de Soto accepted and rewarded their subservience and tribute with little more than trinkets.  More often than not, the larger chiefdoms, upon which de Soto descended, reacted violently. By the time the army was in the Colonel's neck of the woods they had fought pitched, set-piece battles with a half dozen different large chiefdoms and running skirmishes throughout their trek with dozens of smaller chiefdoms.  The army suffered heavy losses of men and material, and by the second year of the expedition were clothed no better than the natives.

But still, de Soto pressed on.  At each new village and chiefdom, de Soto had but one overriding question: "Where is the largest city, and is there gold?"  The Inca or Aztec analog in La Florida did not exist, and de Soto literally wore himself and his army out in the fruitless search for it.   

Two years after landing in Tampa Bay, de Soto reached the Mississippi River near present day Memphis.  As they did at each major river on their march, the army built large boats and crossed the Mississippi, bringing scores of horses, several hundred hogs, and a couple hundred native slaves with them.  The next several months were spent searching for cities of gold throughout present-day Arkansas and Southeastern Missouri.  They found only scattered chiefdoms eager to repel the invaders from their territories.   Nearly a year after crossing the great river, his hopes of finding a rich civilization to subdue dashed, de Soto fell sick and died on the west bank of the Mississippi.

Before he died, de Soto conferred command of the army to Luis de Moscoso.  The army now wanted no more searching for gold and physical sacrifice.  They wanted to go southwest to Mexico, where their countrymen had established "civilized" colonies.  Moscoso first scouted for an overland route, but discovered increasingly difficult geography and fewer native villages from which to procure corn as they traveled into what is now East Texas.  They turned back to their starting point on the Mississippi River, built and provisioned boats, and sailed down the river to the Gulf and then west to Mexico.  Less than half the number that began the expedition in Cuba three years earlier made it to Mexico.

As Hudson narrates each leg of the de Soto expedition, he takes great pains to describe what is now known about the native cultures at each contact point.  The picture he paints is of a myriad small subcultures almost all influenced in one way or another by the late Mississippian, "mound-building," culture.

Mississippian culture began in the Mississippi River valley around 800 A.D.   Archeologists, who coined the term "Mississippian" to denote it, have determined that the culture grew out of a shift from hunting and gathering to an increasing dependency on the cultivation of corn; a grain that grew easily and robustly in the alluvial soils of the large river deltas of the Southeast, returned high yields, and endured long storage.  The cultivation of corn, as opposed to the nomadic nature of a hunter/gatherer lifestyle, rooted people in place.  A collection of family farms became a village.  A collection of villages became a chiefdom.  And, as the natural conflict of man continued, stronger chiefs conquered and annexed lesser chiefdoms, or at least demanded tribute from them.  

The enduring, dominant, and perhaps most characteristic trait of mankind is warfare.  Conflict between neighboring hominids is as old as one wants to peer back into the geological record.  Warfare between small collections of people tends to be limited -- characterized by raiding resulting in relatively low casualties.  In the case of the Mississippian cultures there was no clear economic or political incentive in completely wiping out one's neighboring enemy.  In many cases enmity between neighboring chiefdoms actually drove the development of larger and larger political associations, with political centers of power growing hand in hand with religious ritualism and necessitating the building of larger and larger civilization centers. 

By the time the army of de Soto arrived in the Southeast, the great Mississippian cultures had reached their zenith and were in decline.  In many local cases the decline had been cataclysmic, with little left but native remnants who knew nothing about the builders of the great earthen mounds around which they lived.  In some cases, great swaths of territory were completely devoid of inhabitants where once great numbers were extant.  The cause of the Mississippian culture's collapse is unknown, but was certainly either warfare, climate change, epidemic disease, or habitat destruction and crop failure; or a combination of all or parts of the above.   

Even the mighty chiefdoms -- Apalachee, Cofitachequi, Coosa, Chicaza, Quizquiz, Utiangue, Anilco, Quigualtam, and others -- thriving when de Soto arrived, were themselves gone a century later, the remnants of which coalesced into new tribal collectives, namely the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creeks, and Seminoles.  Contrary to uneducated popular belief, even these tribes were not 100% native American blood -- European and African interbreeding began with, and exponentially expanded from, first contact.   At the time of their removal from the Southeast in the 19th Century, each of the "five civilized" tribes were amalgams of many disparate native ancestors, European descendents, and former African slaves, each bound only by a shared language and relatively recently adopted cultural practices. 

The great irony of the de Soto story is that in the Spaniards' frantic search for instant wealth in the lands of La Florida, they catastrophically failed to see the forest for the trees.  The wealth of what became the Southeastern United States was not what gold or silver the ground did or did not produce, but the ground itself.  Had de Soto chosen a strategic position on the Mississippi River or any of the other major tributaries that either fed into the Mississippi or the Gulf of Mexico and established a colony, he could have eventually ruled an agricultural kingdom larger and richer than any on earth at the time.

Strategic myopia has always been, and will likely always be, the great limiting condition of man.