Monday, March 02, 2020

Planning on the Fly

The helicopter unexpectedly banked hard left and the Colonel (then a captain commanding the best rifle company in the Marine Corps), sitting on the left side of the aircraft, felt the lurch of chow to choke point that often accompanied being thrown around in the dark with the varietal bouquet of engine exhaust, fear, and his fellows' last night's beer in his nostrils.  What he could see out the small round window opposite him only served to compound the Colonel's concern -- he was facing upward and caught sight of another helicopter passing closely... much, much, too closely. 

The assault plan, briefed a half dozen times over the last 24 hours, had called for a simple, straight-in approach to the landing site.  But, plans rarely survive past the first moment of execution.  

This plan had survived longer than most.  

The Colonel's command was training for one of the most likely missions it would expect to be given during its rapidly impending deployment to the Mediterranean as the dedicated "helicopter-borne" company embarked aboard one of the Navy's big gray uglies.   

The mission was called "airfield seizure."  

The standards to which the helicopter-borne company, and the composite helicopter squadron on whose rotary-winged beasts the infantry Marines rode, trained were fairly stringent:

Within six hours of mission receipt from higher headquarters, plan and launch a long-range raid from amphibious shipping; to include phasing through one or more FARPs (forward arming and refueling points) in order to seize and secure an airfield for use by follow-on forces.  

With such a tight window for planning, everything was standardized in SOPs (standing operating procedures).  


The helicopter-borne company could count on a mix of six CH-46E medium lift helicopters, two CH-53E heavy lift helicopters, and two AH-1W light attack helicopters (for close-in fire support).  While the Colonel's rifle company -- reinforced with jeep-mounted .50 caliber and 40mm heavy machine gun and TOW anti-tank missile squads, and a combat engineer squad -- topped the scales at around 210 Marines and Navy hospital corpsmen, this 6-2-2 configuration limited the number of his nominal raid force to a little less than half that number.



The Colonel and his lieutenants designed an SOP that permanently assigned each platoon a mission in a notional raid force they nicknamed "Bald Eagle."

1st Platoon, commanded by Al Adler, was designated the security element.  The heavy gun and TOW squads were attached to 1st Platoon.  The security element's mission during raids (as well as all other operations) was to provide isolation of the objective area and over-watch of the movement of the assault element.  They were the shield

3rd Platoon, commanded by John Burke, was designated the assault element.  A 7.62 medium machine gun squad, and a light anti-armor rocket squad from the company's Weapons Platoon were attached to the assault element.  The assault element's mission was to act as the spear of the raid force.

Weapons Platoon (minus attachments to the assault and security elements), commanded by Tony Wells, was designated the support element.  The combat engineer squad, along with their little flat-bed mechanical "mule," were attached to the support element. 

2nd Platoon, commanded by Pat Hollis, and reinforced with machine guns and rockets (plus Marines and sailors from the other platoons for which there was no room in the 6-2-2 mix of helicopters), was permanently designated as the company reserve.  But, 2d Platoon had another special assignment -- any time a mission called for a platoon-sized element such as rescue of downed airmen (Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel, or TRAP) or reinforcement of Navy ships without significant security elements aboard, Pat and his Marines got the nod.  This force was nicknamed "Sparrow Hawk."

Per SOP, each of the two heavy-lift helicopters carried three of the company's jeeps -- four heavy machine gun and two TOW jeeps in total.  Each jeep had a crew of three Marines, but, since the CH-53Es were such heavy-hauling beasts, each jeep also carried an additional Marine from the raid element (security element) to which the heavy machine gun/TOW squad was attached.  Two more Marines could fit on jump seats forward of the jeeps. So each of the two CH-53Es carried 14 Marines.

The SOP for loading the six medium lift helicopters called for one CH-46E to carry the combat engineer squad's mechanical mule and eight Marines.  Another CH-46E carried a small motorcycle and ten Marines.  The remaining four 46's carried 12 Marines each.

Every man in the raid force knew exactly what "heli-team" he was in, and on which helicopter he was assigned, by SOP.  There was never any wasted time rebuilding team and helicopter assignments for each mission -- except for minor modifications in the case of replacements due to casualties or higher-headquarters strap-hangers. 

Every man in the raid force knew what his SOP "load-out" of weapon, equipment, ammo, chow, and water was.  No need to spend time telling him what to bring.   

When the "Bald Eagle" raid force was given the mission of seizing an airfield, the Colonel and his lieutenants ran through a rapid planning drill that included mission analysis to determine "stated" and "implied" missions, map and photo reconnaissance of the objective area to determine known and likely enemy positions and reinforcing avenues of approach, and location of desired landing sites for each individual helicopter in order to best facilitate the embarked raid element's tactical mission.  With repetition, it soon became obvious that a fairly standard template existed for locations of key parts of an airfield -- runways and taxiways, control tower, hangars, access control points, facility gates, etc.  So, with modifications to fit differences in key terrain that controlled the airfield, locations of landing sites for each of the raid force elements was relatively constant.

All that remained was coordinating with the helicopter squadron's planning cell and the pilot designated flight "lead."  Since all heli-teams and aircraft assignments were SOP, the only real issues to iron out was the landing sites for each helicopter and the routes to and from those sites which were influenced by terrain, wind direction, and any known or suspected anti-aircraft threat. 


Probably the most dangerous part of these missions was the loading of aircraft with vehicles and personnel....

...on a loud, crowded, pitching and rolling deck space about half the size of a football field...

...with ten helicopters "turning and burning"...

...at night

At launch, each helicopter lifted off, slipped to the side and then forward away from the ship...

...off of a crowded, pitching and rolling deck...

...at night.

The flight to the objective was usually low-level in a relatively close formation -- the light attack helicopters ranging ahead to deal with any threats.  At a pre-designated point short of the airfield, the formation broke up and each helicopter headed to its assigned landing site.

The helicopters carrying the security element jeeps normally landed at sites at either end of the runway and the jeeps rolled off and out to their tactical positions astride any high-speed avenues of possible enemy approach.

The assault element helos usually landed near the control tower and other airfield support buildings.  Winds permitting, the helos would land as close to the buildings as possible and pivot on landing to put the rear ramp facing the assault element's initial objectives.  Speed and shock action was paramount.

The support element would usually land mid-point of the airfield's primary runway.  A Marine on the motorcycle would make a rapid reconnaissance of the runway to scout for obstacles.  

Once the assault element had secured the airfield's support facilities, the command group (the Colonel and his radio operators) and the support element would hoof it over and join them.  

In theory, an airfield could be seized and secured in a matter of minutes.  Once any obstacles were cleared, follow-on forces (with missions elsewhere) could fly in -- either in helos from amphibious shipping or in fixed wing aircraft (C-130 or C-141).  The airfield could be used as an evacuation point, a FARP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point), or as a staging area for larger units. 

Back to the hard bank at the top of this post...

The target airfield was... well... it's a secret.  The Colonel could tell you, but then he would have to quarantine you with a half dozen recent returnees from Wuhan.               

Best job the Colonel ever had.

   

1 comment:

Walle, A. said...

Hollis was the shit although anything having to do with Geiger was usually a party and I have a much clearer memory of others than I do Hollis who is, at this point, barely an image, a few memories at best. What stuck with me with him was how quiet and civil he was which could fool you; he was no pushover--I think it was the "JC Penney's look" officers were required to appear in while on libo that made one doubt their range. Lt. Hollis let the platoon "jump him" in a Battle Royale one afternoon in C 1/8's squad-bay--I think it was called that at the time and that could happen at any time, that you could get jumped. This came in handy for me years later, any time I felt I might be jumped I was usually ready, especially if there were several. I was no fool and would have never laid a finger on an officer, even a boot lieutenant like him at the time, but it was not uncommon to walk into someone's "cube" asking if anyone had spare batteries, or maybe a few bucks or maybe you wandered in there to shoot the shit when suddenly you'd get a surprise that was often half-expected, no punches mind you, it was all in good fun and a great way to always be on the ready (there was one cat who did not dig this, the Suck had to let him go, and he'd just got there; he went insane when they tried it on him, he had some problems upstairs and after being discharged claimed he would whack a few squad leaders the next time he saw them out on town, such threats amazingly never really taken seriously--they lived). "The Goz" fought off one of the biggest jumps I ever saw; he was shaking people off of his legs with nothing but his leg. He was Iowa-farm strong who never needed a weight room. He also picked-up the ugliest women in port immediately while the rest of us could only hope as we struggled with standards and dignity. Hollis fought everyone off like a warrior, never pressing charges or having a problem with such an approach. I had nothing to do with that although I did watch; for his size, he was strong and an all-around cool dude. I am aware that OCS is much worse than enlisted boot camp; there is no comparison as far as I know; you might get some half-baked enlisted--there were plenty of them but it was rare that an officer was a complete kook although a few were. One time, during some down-time in the field, High asked "Who's the ******* tossing pebbles at my helmet?!!" It was the Lt. who did not let that go, despite being the one tossing pebbles, digging his radioman who was also a fighter for his size but not that day aw