The Colonel, who can't stand the man, is generally in agreement with President Trump's plan to use the U.S. military to secure our southern border.
In fact, the Colonel has opined for decades that this course of action is not just a good idea, but an imperative. There is no more important mission for the Department of Defense than defending the Homeland.
The Colonel fears, however, that the plans provided POTUS by SECDEF for use of military force on the border will be more of the same minimal, half-hearted, support-role-only effort that has characterized previous border deployments.
A paradigm shift in thinking is required.
Senior military commanders and civilian defense officials have historically (at least over the last century) balked at using regular military forces for border control. There seems to be three major reasons for this reticence: fear of political fallout over militarization of the border, misinterpretation of the restrictions of posse comitatus, and worry over adverse impact on training and deployment tempo.
The Colonel, in order to get to the issue for which he believes the greatest shift in thinking is required, will summarily address the first two reasons.
Militarization of the border. Seriously? Let's, for the sake of argument, posit that a half million persons cross our southern border illegally each year (the Colonel believes that number is low) and that 99% of those persons will otherwise be productive and law-abiding (the Colonel believes that number is high). That leaves 5 thousand (1% of 500,000) persons with nefarious intent -- violent gang activity, drug smuggling, human trafficking, armed robbery, etc... (not to mention terrorism) -- a clear and present danger to the security of the citizens of the United States -- invading our territory annually. We've been fighting similar-sized insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan for 15 years now. Surely, a similar-sized military operation on our southern border is warranted.
Restrictions of Posse Comitatus. In 1878, a Democrat Party (primarily from southern states) controlled United States Congress passed, and President Rutherford B. Hayes signed into law, an amendment to the 1879 Army Appropriations Act that, in response to the excesses of post-Civil War Reconstruction, codified limitations on the future use of federal forces for domestic law enforcement. In the late 1950s, U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 67, § 1385 established that: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." This law prevents state and local authorities from using federal forces to enforce state and local laws. HOWEVER, the Constitution gives the President unfettered authority to use federal military forces in whatever capacity he deems necessary to protect the rights and safety of American citizens -- checked, of course, by Congressional oversight and funding. A simple presidential emergency declaration would set aside any posse comitatus restrictions (see the use of the 101st Airborne Division in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1956 and Oxford, Mississippi in 1962). Frankly, from a purely Constitutional standpoint, the Colonel would prefer an act of congress authorizing military operations on the border. But, given the fact that Congress has generally shirked this requirement since 1945, the Colonel will take what he can get.
So, concerns over militarization of the border and the restrictions of posse comitatus are specious, particularly given the serious nature -- a clear and present danger -- of the threat to the security of the citizens of the United States by thousands of nefarious actors invading across our southern border annually. The Colonel does not advocate use of federal military forces to apprehend illegal immigrants already within the interior of the United States -- that is clearly in the purview of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and should remain so. He does, however, advocate for the establishment of a narrow security zone along the more rural and more inaccessible sections of the southern border in which the full range of "low-intensity" U.S. military capabilities -- honed to near-perfection over the last 15 years of counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan -- would be authorized to intercept persons in the act of illegally entering (invading) the territory of the United States.
Oh, and lest he be accused of prejudice toward the populations south of the border, the Colonel would advocate for northern border defensive deployments should a threat from that direction warrant.
This, then, brings us to the red herring so often trotted out by senior military and civilian defense officials to oppose use of regular military forces in border defense roles -- such action will be detrimental to training and operational tempo. The question begged is this: "What is the mission of the United States military, if not primarily to defend the territory of the United States?"
And, any military commander worth his or her rank and salt should know how to maximize training opportunities and even create required training opportunities in the midst of what on the surface seems to be inopportune or inconducive situations or environments.
One of the Colonel's more influential mentors taught him the following early in his career: "Training is everything, and everything is training." With this philosophy, even the most mundane, "administrative" (non-combat) garrison chore can be used to train for some critical component of a unit's combat mission.
Using this philosophy as an infantry battalion operations officer, the Colonel and his staff section put every possible administrative instruction to subordinate units in the same operational order format that would be used for combat. Believe it or not, the Marine Corps, arguably the most forward-leaning, combat-focused service, used "bulletins" whose format differed considerably from combat operational orders to provide instruction on 90% of a unit's activities. Not only that, but there was an onerous administrative inspection regime built around ensuring that non-combat orders and bulletins conformed to a strict format. This meant that an operations section spent only 10% of its time training on the writing of combat orders, and subordinate units saw combat operations order formats only 10% of the time. Putting almost all administrative instructions and orders in combat operational order format increased training opportunity by ten-fold for all concerned.
When a military professional internalizes the philosophy of "everything is training" it changes the way he or she conducts everything his or her unit does 24/7.
Instead of mustering a "ten-man working party" from a 40-man rifle platoon to accomplish a logistics section material handling requirement (which results in the ten most junior Marines from across the platoon's three squads being taken away from their normal teammates and placed under the control of a Marine from the logistics section), a leader viewing "everything as training" responds to the working party requirement by giving a rifle squad (nominally 10+ Marines) a mission -- in combat order format -- to which it responds in team integrity, with its leadership intact to ensure accomplishment of the mission all the while learning valuable lessons in leading men in inglorious tasks.
This "everything is training" philosophy writ large can accomplish a large proportion of a combat unit's training for mission essential tasks even when participating in events which on the surface are very dissimilar to that unit's actual combat missions.
Leadership imagination and enthusiasm is the key.
When the Colonel took command of an infantry battalion in Hawaii in 1997, he was "advised" that training areas on the island were so restrictive in size and availability that battalion-sized field exercises were all but impossible. Also, the prevailing attitude was that battalion-level exercises interfered with smaller unit training. The Colonel was lucky to have a tremendously talented battalion operations officer who quickly bought into the "everything is training" philosophy and built a "battalion in the defense" exercise that took place completely within the confines of the battalion's barracks area. The battalion's complete mobile combat operations center was set up in the central physical training field and the subordinate rifle companies were given sectors in a 360 degree defense. Each company in turn designated platoon, squad, and fire team sectors for which each drew defensive fire plan sketches. Each company submitted complete map overlays of their sectors' defenses to the battalion operation center. At the completion of a few hours training, squad, platoon and company leaders cycled through the battalion operations center and saw how their individual plans fit into the entire battalion's defensive plan, and how the battalion operations center would coordinate their calls for battalion-level and higher artillery and close air support based on their plans. One day; highly productive training at all levels from four-man fireteam to 800-man infantry battalion; all without leaving the "administrative" confines of the battalion barracks area.
Likewise, battalion training hikes -- the Marine Corps term is "forced marches" -- in the confines of the urban area of Marine Corps Base, Kaneohe Bay, were used not only as hours and hours of heavy-load carrying physical conditioning, but also as opportunities to exercise command and control. The battalion's scout sniper and target acquisition platoon moved ahead of the battalion column, conducting route reconnaissance and establishing overwatch positions (reporting back via radio). At each rest break, the battalion operations center supervised a company commander face to face handover and "passage of lines" as the next company in trail took over at the head of the battalion column. Down the chain of command, subordinate units practiced (at least in theory) the immediate actions for close security during halts in the march.
When a combat organization keeps its combat mission in mind, even the most non-combat activities can provide valuable combat-related training.
So, deploying Marine Air-Ground Task Forces or Army Brigade Combat Teams to the Southwestern border area of the United States (where many of them are already stationed) need not be detrimental to training. Command and control, and logistical support, of forces spread over a wide area is one of the most difficult and critical tasks of a combat organization -- border security provides great training opportunity for both. Live-fire ranges aboard the many military bases in the Southwest can be used to maintain proficiency for heavy weapons not required for the border security mission.
Will the border security mission increase an already strenuous operational tempo? It will if we don't reexamine and prioritize our world-wide defensive commitments in light of the threat literally at our gates.
Don't tell the Colonel it can't be done. Not only can it be done. It must be done.
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